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Abstract 
 
According to the evolutionary sceptic, the fact that our cognitive faculties evolved radically 
undermines their reliability.  A number of evolutionary epistemologists have sought to refute 
this kind of scepticism. This paper accepts the success of these attempts, yet argues that 
refuting the evolutionary sceptic is not enough to put any particular domain of beliefs – 
notably scientific beliefs, which include belief in Darwinian evolution – on a firm footing. 
The paper thus sets out to contribute to this positive justificatory project, underdeveloped in 
the literature. In contrast to a “wholesale” approach, attempting to secure justification for all 
of our beliefs on the grounds that our belief-forming mechanisms evolved to track truth, we 
propose a “piecemeal” approach of assessing the reliability of particular belief-forming 
mechanisms in particular domains. This stands in contrast to the more familiar attempt to 
transfer warrant obtained for one domain (e.g. common sense beliefs) to another (e.g. 
scientific beliefs) by showing how one is somehow an extension of the other. We offer a 
naturalist reply to the charge of circularity by appealing to reliabilist work on the problem of 
induction, notably Peter Lipton’s distinction between self-certifying and non-self-certifying 
inductive arguments. We show how, for scientific beliefs, a non-self-certifying argument 
might be made for the reliability of our cognitive faculties in that domain. We call this 
strategy Humean Bootstrapping,  
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1. Introduction 
 
We have evolved, and so have our minds. But what have our minds evolved to do? It would 
be nice if we could answer that they have evolved to produce true beliefs, at least in certain 
domains where we like to think that our beliefs are true. Notable among these is the domain 
that the theory of evolution itself occupies, the domain of scientific beliefs. But according to 
the evolutionary sceptic, the fact that our belief-forming mechanisms evolved means that we 
are not warranted in thinking that any of our beliefs are true. They evolved for fitness, and 
fitness is not truth. 
This sceptical doubt is as old as the Darwinian theory of evolution itself, since 
Charles Darwin formulated it: 
But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has 
been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any 
one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? (Darwin 
1881) 
A growing number of naturalists, however, have put up a strong case against evolutionary 
sceptical worries (Fales 1996, McKay and Dennett 2009, Law 2012, Wilkins and Griffiths 
2012, Boudry and Vlerick 2014). They have forcefully argued that evolutionary 
considerations are not at odds with epistemic reliability. In fact, as McKay and Dennett put it, 
“although survival is the only hard currency of natural selection, the exchange rate with truth 
is likely to be fair in most circumstances.” (McKay and Dennett 2009, 509). In other words, 
in most cases our cognitive faculties can be expected to have evolved for truth-tracking. As 
one of the authors has put it in another paper, “evolution does care about truth” (Boudry & 
Vlerick 2014). 
We think these defences against evolutionary scepticism are convincing. We are less 
confident, however, that they warrant a strong confidence in all or even most domains of 
beliefs. It is easy to suppose, as Descartes did, that refuting scepticism amounts to 
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justification: to putting knowledge on a secure foundation. But, at least in the case of 
evolutionary scepticism, this does not follow. The evolutionary sceptic doubts all of our 
beliefs; the defence merely establishes that this sceptical worry, concerning all of our beliefs, 
is not warranted. Fitness and truth are not in universal tension; indeed, there are good reasons 
to think that the ability to form beliefs about a given domain is selected for only if the beliefs 
are largely true. But this is not enough to show that all of our beliefs are true (thankfully! 
since that would be incredible). Less obviously, nor is it enough to show that in any 
particular domain of beliefs, our beliefs are likely to be true, beyond domains on which 
selection pressure operated directly. In particular, it is not enough to show that the domain of 
beliefs where the theory of evolution resides, the domain of scientific beliefs, is likely to 
contain true beliefs, given that it has been produced by evolved cognitive faculties. 
There is thus an important distinction to be made between responding to the 
evolutionary sceptic (which we call the negative project), and providing our beliefs in any 
given domain – for example, our scientific beliefs – with epistemic justification (which we 
call the positive project). Our central aim in this paper is to contribute to the positive project. 
The negative project has received a lot of attention in the literature. It has been 
convincingly argued, contra Plantinga (1993) and other evolutionary sceptics, that scepticism 
is not warranted merely by the fact that our cognitive faculties evolved. Grounding the origin 
of our cognitive faculties in an evolutionary process does not undermine the reliability of 
those faculties. We take this to have been convincingly established in the literature. We 
summarise, but do not seek to contribute to the negative project. 
The positive project of providing our best theories about the world with justification is 
underdeveloped in the literature (cf. De Cruz et al 2011). Of course, naturalists have made 
positive claims: Wilkins and Griffiths (2012), for example, suggest that common sense and 
scientific beliefs can be justified. However, the argument is not made out in any detail: it is 
vulnerable to uncharitable readings on which it is simply fallacious, and more charitable 
readings require additional material that is not supplied in any work of which we are aware. It 
is here that we hope to contribute something useful. 
In Section 2, we summarise the negative project, relying largely on a good recent 
implementation in two papers by Wilkins and Griffiths (2012, in press). In Section 3, we 
distinguish the positive from the negative project. We distinguish wholesale from piecemeal 
scepticism and justification, and show that refuting wholesale scepticism is insufficient for 
 4
establishing piecemeal justification. In other words, refuting evolutionary scepticism in 
general, as Wilkins and Griffiths do, is not enough to establish that any particular domain of 
beliefs is justified. 
In Section 4, we embark on the positive project, setting out the elements of an 
alternative strategy that we call Humean Bootstrapping. This strategy draws on externalist 
responses to other kinds of scepticism, notably the response of reliabilists such as Peter 
Lipton in the context of induction. The core idea is that there is more than one kind of 
circularity, and that some circles are better than others. In certain domains, we argue, the use 
of cognitive faculties to justify the claim that those cognitive faculties are truth-producing 
amounts to a virtuous circle, not a vicious one. We apply Lipton’s test: if the hypothesis were 
false, the evidence would have been different; or, as he puts it even more succinctly, “if the 
conclusion had not been true, you would have noticed” (Lipton 2000: 184-5). It is a 
contingent fact that a given faculty’s outputs satisfy this test, and the assertion of that fact is 
subject to empirical justification; the strategy is thus a piecemeal one, which must proceed 
faculty by faculty. We cannot connect the fact that our cognitive faculties have evolved to 
their wholesale reliability; but we can justify the claim that particular faculties and methods 
are reliable in particular domains. We can establish that they track truth piecemeal, by 
establishing that if they did not, we would have noticed. We argue that this is true of common 
sense beliefs and of those in the scientific domain. Section 5 deals with the cognitive 
underpinning of our proposed strategy for epistemic justification, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.The negative project 
 
Building upon previous research in evolutionary epistemology, Wilkins and Griffiths (2012, 
in press) undercut evolutionary sceptical worries by showing that truth-tracking and fitness-
tracking are not alternatives. They are, according to Wilkins and Griffiths, different levels of 
explanation, not potentially rival explanations. It makes no sense to ask whether the bird’s 
wing evolved for locomotion or “merely” to enhance the bird’s fitness, because locomotion is 
part of what the wing contributes to a bird’s fitness. Likewise, it makes no sense to ask 
whether squirrels evolved long bushy tails to enhance balance, or “merely” to enhance 
fitness. And it makes no sense to ask whether the human mind evolved for truth-tracking or 
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“merely” for fitness enhancing. Truth-tracking is how belief-forming mechanisms enhance 
fitness, just as balance is for squirrels’ tails, and locomotion for birds’ wings. Truth, they 
conclude, is “the currency of evolutionary success in the domain of cognition” (Wilkins and 
Griffiths in press). 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence abounds for the existence of stubborn cognitive 
biases. Humans err. They do so systematically, and in diverse areas. Not only do our “fast 
and frugal” heuristics often lead us astray in areas ranging from probability calculus to logic 
(for an extensive overview see Kahneman 2011), but our reasoning also seems to be 
systematically biased when making judgements under uncertainty, when the costs associated 
with false positive errors (asserting something is the case when in fact it is not) and false 
negative errors (asserting something is not the case when in fact it is) have been asymmetric 
over evolutionary history. This prompts Haselton and Nettle (2006) to dub the bias-riddled 
human subject “the paranoid optimist”.  
This, Wilkins and Griffiths reply, does not mean truth and fitness are at odds with 
each other. It merely shows that there are constraints to truth-tracking. First of all, organisms 
are subject to resource constraints. Cognition is very costly. Human brains account for up to 
20% of oxygen consumption.3 Perfect truth-tracking is simply not affordable. The expensive 
nature of the cognitive apparatus constrains the ability to track truth. There is an undeniable 
trade-off between accuracy and cost, and when the added value of increasing accuracy does 
not weigh up against the added costs of such cognitive improvement, it will not be selected 
for.  
Not only that, but the attempt to maximise accuracy given cost constraints may 
actually give rise to fallacies and biases. The tendency to ignore base rates, for example, 
might lead to error in certain situations, but it may lead to more truth in situations where 
ignoring the base rate makes little difference. It will do this because each operation involves a 
cost, and ignoring base rates saves costs, meaning that a larger number of such operations 
may be performed given a certain resource base. Considering that base rate calculations are 
largely superfluous in natural environments since these environments rarely present us with 
random sampling (Gigerenzer 1991), we can see why such a bias evolved. Thus a tendency to 
                                                            
3 This, Wilkins and Griffiths note, refutes another debunking line of argument, claiming that truth‐tracking 
might be adaptive, but that human cognition just is not an adapted feature, but a mere frivolous ‘spandrel’ or 
exaptation. As Wilkins and Griffiths point out, following Fales (1996, 440–1) among others, such an expensive 
set of faculties would have been selected away if it had not conferred our ancestors with an adaptive 
advantage. 
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commit a fallacy may evolve, not merely as a trade-off between cost and accuracy, but in 
order to improve accuracy given cost constraints. Cheap fallacy can, in the right 
circumstances, deliver more truth than costly validity. 
Moreover, Wilkins and Griffiths continue, another constraint arises from the “intrinsic 
logical structure of many cognitive tasks”. When an organism makes a decision under 
uncertainty, given fixed resources, it is logically impossible to reduce the risk of one type of 
error (let’s say false negatives) without increasing the risk of the opposite type of error (in 
this case false positives). Natural selection therefore faces the task of achieving an optimal 
balance between the two types of errors. It is wrong to argue from the existence of cognitive 
fallacies that evolution does not care about truth or worse, selects against truth, since these 
fallacies often aim at maximising truth-tracking abilities within the confines of both cost 
constraints and constraints arising from the logical structure of recurring problems in the 
environment. The significance of this line of argument is not to show that any particular 
domain of belief is free of error. Rather, it shows that the exhibition of a cognitive fallacy is 
not enough to establish that evolution does not select for truth. Cognitive biases, the argument 
states, are actually truth-maximising given constraints.  
This, however, does not establish that our evolved faculties are truth-producing in any 
particular domain. Nor does it resolve the worry that the modern environment differs 
importantly from the environment that shaped these faculties. Establishing these things, we 
take it, is part of the positive project of showing that particular domains of belief – sets of 
beliefs that we actually hold – have been formed by mechanisms that are probably reliable.  
 
3. From negative to positive? 
 
It is easy to suppose that if the sceptic is refuted, or at least fended off, then the task of 
justifying those beliefs we wish to believe is done. The sceptic doubts; the reply shows that 
the doubt is not warranted; what further cause is there to worry? But this is not right—at 
least, not in the context of evolutionary scepticism. 
Evolutionary scepticism is (typically) wholesale: it undermines all of our beliefs, by 
arguing that the biological structures that produced those beliefs were subject to selection 
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pressures that had nothing to do with truth. The reply is that truth is not an alternative to 
fitness. Truth-tracking is the contribution that cognitive fallacies make to fitness, just as flight 
and balance are the contributions to fitness made by birds’ wings and squirrels’ tails 
respectively. The reply therefore is a negation of wholesale scepticism. Negating the claim, 
however, that all our belief-forming mechanisms are unreliable does not entail that any 
particular subset is reliable. Perhaps this simple logical point is obvious, but it is not always 
prominent in the literature. 
There are some positive piecemeal justifications on offer for common sense belief. 
For example, if we accept that truth is the way that cognition confers a selective benefit, then 
it is plausible that, in the domain of common sense beliefs, organisms that have beliefs track 
truth so as to obtain “as much relevant truth as they can afford” (Wilkins and Griffiths 2012, 
137-8). Common sense beliefs, therefore, meaning “everyday beliefs guiding our mundane 
action”, are produced by cognitive adaptations that track truth (Wilkins and Griffiths 2012, 
137–8). Given that the differences between contemporary and ancestral environments are not 
so great that common sense beliefs are likely to misfire radically in modern environments, we 
can use this evolutionary argument to provide core common sense beliefs (such as the belief 
in an external world and the belief in other minds) with justification (cf. Stewart-Williams 
2005).  
But as Wilkins and Griffiths point out, the interesting project in the context of 
epistemic justification does not so much concern our day-to-day, common sense inferences 
about our immediate environment, but our elaborate scientific explanations aimed at tracking 
truths that transcend our particular ‘Umwelt’4 (Wilkins and Griffiths 2012, 140). The main 
task awaiting the naturalist is not so much debunking the evolutionary sceptic – who denies 
us justification of even our most basic and self-evident beliefs on the grounds that they are 
the product of faculties shaped by a natural evolutionary process – but to provide our best 
scientific theories with epistemic justification (the positive project). Too often a sharp 
distinction is not drawn between these two projects, and it is tacitly assumed that rebutting 
the sceptic by establishing that natural selection shaped our cognitive faculties for truth-
tracking, yields us the positive project at the same time. This tempting, but fallacious, line of 
thought states that our scientific beliefs are the product of evolved faculties, and because 
these faculties evolved to track truth in ecologically relevant contexts, they can be expected 
                                                            
4 This term coined by Uexküll (1909), designates the particular realm of awareness in which every species is 
encapsulated, as the outcome of its perceptual and conceptual categories. 
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to track truth in general. Therefore, the argument goes, the beliefs that they give rise to in the 
scientific domain are justified. This strategy we call the “evolutionary wholesale strategy” for 
epistemic justification. Although it is tempting, on closer inspection it harbours two major 
flaws. 
The argument may be refined as follows: 
1. Our cognitive faculties are truth-tracking (premise) 
2. Scientific beliefs are produced by our cognitive faculties (premise) 
3. Scientific beliefs track truth (conclusion) 
The argument, as stated, is valid. The first major problem, however, concerns premise 1. As 
Boulter (2007) points out, only common sense beliefs - the type of beliefs that enabled our 
ancestors to cope with their environment – are on the radar of natural selection. These beliefs 
include belief in the existence of other minds, the occurrence of past events, and the 
reliability of perception (De Cruz et al 2011: 520). In other words, our cognitive faculties 
evolved to track truth in a narrow domain of ecologically relevant beliefs. They did not 
evolve to track truth in general. At most, given that relevant environmental circumstances 
have not changed too radically since the ancestral environment in which our faculties 
evolved, evolutionary considerations give us some justification for our core common sense 
everyday beliefs – not a wholesale justification of all of the output of our cognitive faculties.  
The second problem with the argument is of a general epistemological kind. Even if 
Premise 1 could be justified as it stands, the argument would be ineffective. For what could 
possibly warrant Premise 1, other than scientific evidence for the reliability of our cognitive 
faculties? But if we accept such evidence, we implicitly accept 3, the conclusion. If we reject 
3, we will reject the evidence adduced for 1. As stated, the argument is not circular; but if the 
justification for Premise 1 were included, then 3, or something very much like it, would 
appear. Fully stated, the argument would be premise-circular; the concise statement above 
conceals this only by suppressing all the justificatory steps underlying Premise 1. 
For this reason, there is no reasonable person who will accept the first premise who 
has not already accepted, albeit implicitly, the conclusion that our scientific beliefs are 
generally true. Anyone doubting the conclusion, on the other hand, will also doubt the 
premise. Thus the argument is epistemologically mute. The conclusion cannot be 
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epistemologically significant given that the epistemological stance it states is one that an 
audience must already adopt in accepting the premises. 
While any naturalised epistemology – using instances of knowledge to make claims 
about knowledge in general – must learn to live with circular arguments, circular arguments 
are not all alike. Some are viciously circular, or—like the argument above—reveal 
themselves as being viciously circular when the justification for their premises is explored. 
They do absolutely nothing for us, epistemically speaking. They provide neither a reason to 
believe something we did not previously believe, nor any further warrant for beliefs we 
already have. The recipient of a viciously circular argument is epistemically in just the same 
position as she was beforehand. 
Not all circular arguments are viciously circular, though. “Virtuously circular” 
arguments are like viciously circular arguments in that they are unable to convince the sceptic 
who doubts any given premise. Nevertheless, for those who accept the premises, they provide 
further reasons for believing what one already believed. In the next section we seek to 
characterise virtuous circularity more explicitly, following Peter Lipton’s treatment. Our 
point here is that the wholesale evolutionary argument for epistemic justification is not 
virtuous in any sense. There is nobody who will accept the premises who has not already 
accepted the conclusion; and conversely, anyone doubting the conclusion will also doubt the 
premises.  
One might draw back from a wholesale argument of the very bold kind previously 
advanced, but still seek to build on the success of cognitive mechanisms in forming true 
common sense beliefs in order to justify scientific beliefs. For example: 
1’. Our cognitive faculties are truth-tracking concerning mundane, everyday matters. 
(premise) 
2’. Faculties that are truth-tracking concerning mundane, everyday matters will be truth 
tracking concerning scientific matters. (premise) 
3’. Scientific beliefs are produced by these cognitive faculties that are truth-tracking 
concerning scientific matters. (premise) 
4’. Scientific beliefs track the truth. (from 1-3) 
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This argument is piecemeal in the sense that it focuses on scientific beliefs, but it shares the 
problematic characteristic of wholesale approaches, namely, what we might call domain-
switching. The argument attempts to employ the fact we have good reason to accept that our 
faculties produce true beliefs in one domain (here, common sense) in order to show that they 
produce true beliefs in another domain (here, science). Perhaps that would be a good strategy 
if strong logical links existed between the two domains. But for two domains that are not 
strongly connected, it is very hard to see how it can ever succeed. 
Thus the difficulty with the argument just set out is Premise 2’. The complex 
representations of modern scientific theories, we argue, are by no means an extension of 
common sense beliefs.  Given that natural selection did not shape our minds to track 
scientific truths about the world, and that modern science – as De Cruz and De Smedt (2012) 
point out – is a by-product of cognitive faculties that evolved for survival and reproduction, 
justification cannot merely be extended from the domain of common sense beliefs to the 
domain of scientific beliefs. In fact, evolutionary considerations have been used to 
simultaneously justify core common sense beliefs and debunk scientific beliefs  (cf. Stewart-
Williams 2005).5  
In order to see why justification cannot be unproblematically extended from the 
domain of common sense to scientific beliefs, compare our ‘folk sciences’ to their proper 
scientific counterparts. ‘Folk sciences’ refer to our common sense (or, perhaps, Stone Age) 
beliefs and inference patterns shaped to deal with ecologically relevant aspects of the world, 
such as for instance the world of objects (folk physics) and living organisms (folk biology). 
Both of these folk theories are innately determined (i.e. we are predisposed to develop these 
beliefs – see, for instance, Spelke (1991) and Baillargeon (1991) on innate folk physics and 
Atran (1998) on innate folk biology – and enable us to deal with the environment in a 
survival and reproduction promoting way. They do so, as explained when setting out the 
negative project (see section 2), by tracking affordable and relevant truth in those domains.  
                                                            
5 Stewart‐Williams (2005) argues that the fact of human evolution simultaneously undermines both radical 
scepticism and reasonable confidence in the accuracy of our less basic and more complex representations. 
Exploring the question whether the fact that certain components of our worldview have an evolutionary origin 
implies that these aspects accurately depict the world, he leans towards a negative answer (2005, 792). 
Nevertheless, he finds ground in evolutionary considerations to justify core common sense beliefs against 
radical scepticism and solipsism. More precisely, he argues that given that our belief in a mind‐independent, 
external world is rooted in innate aspects of the mind (since it is not strictly deducible from sensory 
information) and that evolution by natural selection shaped these aspects of the mind, such a world must 
indeed exist (Stewart‐Williams 2005, 794). 
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Folk physics, for instance, enables us to gauge fast and accurately where a thrown 
stone will land, how long a falling rock takes to hit the ground or what will happen when a 
moving object collides with an object in rest. Folk biology, on the other hand, enables us to 
predict the behaviour of unknown animals successfully based on their resemblance with 
known species, gauge whether an unknown plant is edible based on resemblance with known 
plants and in which environment certain organisms will thrive. Improvements in accuracy 
will be selected for to the extent that they are worth their cost, and to this extent, evolutionary 
pressure improves folk science’s ability to track true states of affair. 
However, this does not imply that those folk sciences provide us with accurate or 
even approximately accurate representations of the world in general – i.e. outside of our 
ecological niche. In fact, science proper suggests that they are notoriously inaccurate. Folk 
physics, for instance, is radically contradicted by Newtonian and a fortiori Einsteinian 
physics. It ascribes something like an ‘impetus’ to moving objects and assumes that every 
object’s natural state is at rest. This however, as Pinker (1997, 321) points out, is not 
surprising. In the real world, Newton’s laws are masked by friction (from the air and contact 
with the ground). Our folk physical beliefs serve us well in friction-ridden dealings with 
medium sized dry goods. Indeed, they may represent the best way to maximise truth in a 
resource-restricted context. Similarly, folk biology with its classification of the organic world 
into a complex taxonomy, based on an intuition of hidden traits or essences that members of 
each group at each level share with each other (Atran 1998; Pinker 1997, 323) is useful but 
flatly contradicted by evolutionary theory and population thinking.  
The cognitive faculties and processes underlying our common sense beliefs, it should 
be clear, did not evolve to track biological and physical truth in general, only physical and 
biological truth in a very specific ecological situation. Any evolutionary argument extending 
epistemic justification to scientific beliefs from the premise that our cognitive faculties 
evolved to track truth, overlooks both the depth and the scope at which evolved truth tracking 
mechanisms actually track truths. Selection pressures ensure nothing more than that common 
sense tracks “shallow” truths –  the kind of truths that promote survival (e.g. whether plants 
are poisonous or edible, animals threatening or docile, etc.) – in the “narrow” ecological 
niche in which we evolved. Not the kind of truths modern science aims at in its attempt to 
uncover fundamental laws underlying empirical data which stretch out far beyond our 
ancestral ecological niche. Extending justification to the domain of scientific beliefs, 
therefore, misfires. 
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In fact, if anything, the cognitive faculties and processes underlying our evolved 
common sense modes of understanding form a barrier to overcome when attempting to track 
truth in the enriched conceptual framework in which science operates. In an interesting paper, 
De Cruz and De Smedt (2007) show how our evolved modes of understanding the world 
systematically distort scientific discourse. Science, it appears, is more often than not at odds 
with common sense – or at least good science is. According to Wolpert: “if something fits 
with common sense it almost certainly isn't science” (Wolpert 1992, 11). Any attempt to 
justify our elaborate scientific representations by arguing that they are underwritten by 
cognitive faculties and processes leading to truth-tracking common sense beliefs, gets it 
wrong. There is no hope of doing with evolutionary arguments what Descartes (1641) failed 
to do with God. There is however another strategy available to the naturalist. In contrast to 
the wholesale approach to justification outlined above, this strategy takes a piecemeal 
approach. We call it the “Humean Bootstrapping” strategy.  
 
4. Humean Bootstrapping 
 
The received epistemological stance of the naturalist is that our belief-forming faculties are 
reasonably reliable. This stance is non-optional: were our faculties completely unreliable, any 
attempt at justifying our beliefs is doomed to fail. It is therefore the default assumption and 
the working assumption from which all arguments are mounted. We have rejected the 
strategy of transferring warrant from one domain to another – of showing, for example, that 
our cognitive faculties are truth-sensitive regarding mundane, everyday matters, and then 
seeking to argue on this basis that they are also truth-sensitive regarding scientific matters. 
Instead, we seek direct justification for the reliability of our cognitive faculties in scientific 
domains, by appealing to the default, working assumption of reliability, and “bootstrapping” 
our way from there. 
How could any such strategy hope to avoid vicious circularity? In an important and 
rich paper, Peter Lipton sets out to explain how the inductive justification of induction may 
be worthwhile even if it is not a reply to a sceptic about induction (Lipton 2000). Lipton is 
not the first to suggest this, but his treatment is among the clearest and most thorough, and his 
concern with assessing the warrant for scientific beliefs makes it especially relevant here. 
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Along the way he offers characterisations of circularity in general, solutions to raven and 
grue paradoxes, and rebuttals of the no-miracles argument for realism and the pessimistic 
meta-induction against it. We are here concerned only with his general strategy for 
rehabilitating the inductive justification of induction. 
Lipton points out that there are prima facie reasons to take the inductive justification 
of induction seriously, notwithstanding its bad reputation. In particular, we single out the 
following reason: 
 …the claim that an inductive method is reliable is tantamount to a physical hypothesis that there is a 
correlation between the output of the method and the state of the world. If there can be legitimate 
inductive arguments concerning the expansion of metals when heated, there can be legitimate inductive 
arguments about the reliability of thermometers. (Lipton 2000, 180). 
Lipton’s strategy is to show that the inductive justification is no worse than inductive 
arguments generally: inductive arguments for physical hypotheses, for example. If he 
succeeds, this means that the inductive justification of induction will have value for someone 
who is prepared to rely on inductive inference. Of course, we all fall into that category 
whether we like it or not. The question, then, is whether he can indeed show that the 
inductive justification of induction stands or falls alongside inductive inferences generally: 
whether he can show that the circularity of the inductive justification of induction does not 
matter. 
Lipton’s argument turns on the distinction between two inductive assessments of 
inductive methods: those that are self-certifying and those that are not. A self-certifying 
assessment of an inductive method is such that the use of the method ensures that the 
assessment is positive. For example, consider the claim that a particular thermometer is 
generally reliable. The inductive method under assessment is the use of this thermometer to 
measure temperatures. Compare two ways of assessing this method. One way would be to 
appeal to previous readings of that very thermometer. This would be self-certifying (or 
practically so), because there is (practically) no way for the track record of the thermometer 
to reveal occasions on which it has incorrectly measured the temperature. Another way would 
be to appeal to other readings of independent thermometers, and correlate them with readings 
of the thermometer under assessment. This would not be self-certifying, because 
discrepancies between readings would provide information that could reveal, or at least point 
us to, cases where the thermometer has given erroneous readings. Lipton captures the 
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difference in terms of a Nozickian tracking requirement (Nozick 1981). In the second case, 
“if the conclusion had not been true, we would not have made the inference” (Lipton 2000, 
184); whereas in the first case, we might have.  
Lipton’s claim is that the inductive justification of induction is not necessarily self-
certifying. He is careful not to make his claim for just any inductive assessment of induction, 
since he leaves space for there to be good and bad such assessments, just as there can be good 
and bad inductive arguments more generally. (He is sensitive to the problem that we above 
characterised as domain-switching.) However, his general point is that we ought not to write 
off a given inductive justification of a given inductive method merely because the 
justification, like the method it justifies, is inductive. Unlike premise-circularity, rule-
circularity (where the rule used to arrive at a conclusion is stated by that conclusion) does not 
guarantee that the conclusion is warranted by the premises. The success of an attempt to 
inductively justify an inductive method is not a foregone conclcusion. 
The logical point is, we think, sound. If a method is treated as reliable in the first 
place, there is no special reason to restrict its use so as to exclude the self-assessment of that 
method. Such self-assessment need not be self-certifying. Whether the resulting cognitive 
endeavour is a good one or not is a question to be answered in the same way that one answers 
these questions generally. But it can be good. When it is, it is reasonable for us to regard 
ourselves as having further reason to accept the reliability of M, despite the fact that our 
reason depends on the use of M. This situation we call Humean Bootstrapping: Humean 
because it begins with the fact that we cannot but use certain methods (Hume 1748); and 
bootstrapping because it involves the use of methods to provide reason for accepting the 
reliability of those very methods. 
Humean Bootstrapping, in this regard, provides us with a framework in which the 
initial assumption of the reliability of our faculties (an assumption – as pointed out – which is 
non-optional) can be strengthened, not by securing a link between their origin in an 
evolutionary process and their reliability – as in the case of the wholesale evolutionary 
argument – but by gathering new evidence that these faculties are indeed reliable.6  Whereas 
it is circular and self-certifying to argue that our beliefs are justified because our cognitive 
faculties evolved for truth tracking, it is circular but not self-certifying to use our own 
                                                            
6 In this regard, our approach to epistemic justification is similar to Goldman’s (1975) process reliabilism in 
which a belief is justified if the (causal) process which produced the belief is a reliable one. 
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cognitive faculties to assess their reliability. Indeed, more than often such assessments have 
brought to light that (some) of our faculties and inference-mechanisms are actually not as 
reliable as we assumed (Kahneman 2011). 
Consequently, rejecting wholesale positive justificatory arguments need not mean 
giving up on the project of gaining warrant for our beliefs. We must simply do so piecemeal, 
using our abilities in given domains to assess those abilities. Provided that this is not self-
certifying, our procedure is not epistemically impotent. It may not move someone who is so 
sceptical that she refuses to grant any kind of reliability to our cognitive faculties at the 
outset. But it can help someone who rejects such a sceptical position and is willing to remain 
in ‘the circle of knowledge’ (Russell 1912) to see how it is possible to gain confidence in the 
output of these faculties. In short, epistemic justification of our representations cannot be 
grounded wholesale – in Cartesian fashion – in their evolutionary origin, but there is a 
Humean alternative available to the naturalistic epistemologist. In implementing this strategy, 
we start with the assumption that our faculties are overall reliable (at least reliable enough to 
assess their own reliability) and seek to increase our confidence by putting those faculties to 
the test, or – in Lipton’s lingo – by tracking their track records. 
 
5. Humean Bootstrapping for humans? 
 
The question remains, can we in fact use our faculties to reflect on their reliability? Inductive 
methods in general are not necessarily self-certifying; but it remains to be established that in 
any given domain, our faculties are in fact capable of performing any meaningful assessment 
of their own reliability. How can we adopt a critical stance towards our own cognitive output, 
in the context of scientific inquiry? From a naturalist perspective, we need more than just a 
demonstration of the logical possibility of such a manoeuvre: we need a naturalistic 
explanation for this remarkable ability which underlies our ability to seek justification for our 
beliefs. In order to do so, we turn to the cognitive sciences. 
One way to construct an answer is as follows. Evolution, according to many cognitive 
scientists and evolutionary psychologists (Fodor 1983, Carruthers 2006, Tooby and Cosmides 
1992, Boyer 2000, Mithen 1996, etc.) has endowed us with a number of content-rich, 
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domain-specific cognitive systems, often called modules.7 These innate cognitive systems 
evolved to enable us to deal with important recurrent aspects of our environment, such as 
other people, inanimate objects and living organisms. They underlie our ‘intuitive ontologies’ 
as Boyer refers to them, providing us with ‘a series of category-specific intuitive principles 
that constitute an evolved ‘natural metaphysics’ (Boyer 2000: 277). In other words, they 
underlie our intuitive thinking about the physical, social and natural world – i.e. our folk 
physics, folk psychology, folk biology.  As pointed out previously (section 3), these folk 
representations endow us with characteristically shallow and narrow truth-tracking. 
Therefore, we have argued, these cannot form the basis of an argument for the general 
reliability of scientific beliefs.  
Evolution, however, also equipped us with the cognitive ability to override these 
“modular” outputs and engage in critical reflection (Vlerick 2012). How else could we reflect 
on these folk theories as tracking truth on a shallow and narrow level? This ability to override 
the belief output of our domain-specific, content-rich cognitive systems, is itself an evolved 
cognitive ability, and one that is the hallmark of human intelligence. As Fodor (1985: 4) puts 
it, “what is most characteristic, and puzzling about the higher cognitive mind, [is] its non-
encapsulation, its creativity, its holism and its passion for the analogical.” In other words, 
rather than its content rich domain-specific cognition, the human mind’s distinctive feature is 
precisely its ability to reason outside the confines of its various “intuitive ontologies”.  
A number of cognitive scientists and psychologists have addressed this remarkable 
aspect of human cognition. According to Carey and Spelke (1994), overriding the output of 
our innate cognitive systems is the result of ‘mapping across domains’ (180). This happens 
when the core principles of one knowledge system are applied to the set of entities of another 
system, thereby escaping the principles that naturally – i.e. in virtue of our nature – fit these 
entities. By devising and using systems of measurement in physics, for instance, scientists 
create a “mapping” between the core knowledge system of numeracy and that of physics. 
Therefore, the principles governing the behaviour of physical bodies are no longer those of 
cohesion, continuity and contact – the innate principles underlying our folk physical 
representations (see Spelke 1991) – but the core principles of the system of numeracy, such 
as 1-to-1 correspondence, succession and the like. 
                                                            
7 We are not wedded to the “modularity” thesis, which is an empirical thesis. Whether this thesis is consistent 
with empirical facts about our cognitive make‐up, is a matter of psychology. We just select the modularity 
thesis to demonstrate one way of spelling out, naturalistically, how Humean Bootstrapping might occur in 
humans. 
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Similarly, according to Carruthers (2006) the human mind – which he characterises as 
‘massively modular’ – is endowed with two reasoning systems. The first corresponds to the 
processing of the modules: it is arranged in parallel and operates swiftly and unconsciously. 
The second supervenes on the activity of those systems: it is realised by mental rehearsal in 
general and inner speech in particular and operates more slowly and consciously. It 
integrates, in other words, the content outputs of the various modules, overriding the results 
of the first system (254).  
Natural language, which according to Pinker (2007) provides us with a window into 
human thinking and thought processes, is gorged with tangible evidence of this remarkable 
cognitive process. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have pointed out, metaphor or analogy are 
pervasive in language. Spatial metaphors, for instance, such as up and down, front and back, 
in and out, etc. organise entire systems of abstract concepts (e.g. numbers go up and down, 
and so do feelings, moral standards, professional careers, etc), These analogies show that the 
human mind is very prone and apt to apply elements from one domain of cognition to a 
different domain (such as applying spatial reasoning to numerical values). Metaphors in 
language, in other words, are proof of the way our mind co-opts reasoning patterns that are 
grounded in a particular innate knowledge system to extend it to different domains. 
This distinctive cognitive ability – i.e. the ability of the human mind to override the 
content of its intuitive ontologies it holds in virtue of its content-rich modules evolved to deal 
with recurring and ecologically relevant problems – literally opens up our perspective on the 
world. We are no longer encapsulated in a particular Umwelt or an ‘evolved natural 
metaphysics’ (Boyer 2000) as other species are, but represent the world in ways that 
transcend this given perspective both in depth and in scope. The driving force behind this 
ability is our possession of what one of the authors has called an “epistemic orientation” 
(Vlerick 2012), i.e. an epistemic goal (truth) and epistemic values or criteria for realising this 
goal – such as coherence, predictive accuracy, scope and simplicity. 
This provides us with the necessary compass to track truth beyond our cognitive niche 
and functions as an engine for epistemic improvement. We are able to take the outputs of our 
belief-forming mechanisms, assess them in terms of those epistemic criteria, and possibly 
reject them. We may not be able to do this instantaneously or easily; and we may not be able 
to rid ourselves of cognitive tendencies that we recognise as sub-optimal. Nonetheless, we are 
 18
able to improve our considered beliefs, and direct our considered actions, according to the 
outcome of a process of reflection, as exemplified by science. 
Rather than being endemic to modern science, this epistemic orientation appears to be 
an integral part of our cognitive endowment. According to David Papineau (2000: 202), the 
search for truth is an innate drive, much like hunger and the desire for sex. Peter Carruthers 
(2006: 347) argues that the epistemic values or criteria guiding our search for truth are 
common to all humankind, from modern scientific circles to illiterate hunter-gatherer 
societies. Evolution, in this regard, provided us both with a set of fitness-boosting, content-
rich representational frameworks (giving rise to our “default” common sense outlook on the 
world) and the cognitive tools and compass to actively reflect on these beliefs – and 
ultimately on the reliability of the faculties producing these beliefs.  
A likely evolutionary explanation for this ability is that it evolved in adaptation to 
environmental variability. As Sterelny (2003: 170) argues with Potts (1996), the physical 
environment of hominid evolution has been remarkably unstable. In response, it seems 
plausible, our cognitive apparatus evolved the ability track truth in a wide variety of different 
contexts (consider the need to detect danger such as predators and poisonous plants and track 
prey animals in environments ranging from the Antarctic to the Amazonian rain forest). This 
could account for the fact that we evolved an epistemic compass and a characteristic drive to 
investigate and actively track truth in out surroundings, rather than merely rely on content-
rich modules attuned by natural selection to a fixed set of relevant aspects of our 
environment. 
Whatever the explanation for its origin, however, our ability to transcend our Umwelt 
combined with this evolved “epistemic compass”  explains why science is able to part ways 
with intuition, and why it is able to track truth in such a foreign and ‘enriched conceptual 
framework’ (Wilkins and Griffiths 2012: 140). It also explains why, in Wilkins and Griffiths’ 
words, we are able ‘to use those [cognitive] faculties to debug themselves’. It is therefore in 
this ability or cognitive process, we argue, that the roots of epistemic justification in general, 
and justification of our scientific representations in particular, need to be located. Not in our 
‘given’ common sense worldview (attuned by natural selection to a set of relevant 
environmental properties), but – quite to the contrary – in the cognitive processes enabling us 
to critically reflect on this worldview, expanding it and overthrowing it where necessary.   
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Note that grounding the epistemic process by which we can bootstrap our way to 
justified (scientific) beliefs in a natural, evolutionary process does not commit the fallacy 
exposed in this paper; namely, that of deriving epistemic justification in the domain of 
scientific beliefs by grounding them in evolved – and therefore supposedly truth-tracking – 
cognitive faculties. The motor of epistemic justification resides in the process of ‘tracking our 
track records’. The (tentative) cognitive and evolutionary story of how this process is realised 
in human brains and what selective conditions might explain its evolution, is only developed 
to show how our approach can be accounted for within a naturalist framework (i.e. without 
invoking or presupposing abilities which cannot be accounted for scientifically). In short, 
scientific beliefs are not justified because they are rooted in our (evolved) cognitive ability to 
override modular output. They are justified to the extent that they stand up to critical and 
reflective testing of the reliability of the cognitive processes underlying their formation. The 
human ability to engage in this bootstrapping process, however, is – if the general tenor of 
this section is on the right track – rooted in the remarkable human cognitive ability to 
override modular output.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In response to evolutionary sceptics who argue that given their origin in a natural 
evolutionary process we should not accord any reliability to the output of our cognitive 
faculties, a growing number of evolutionary epistemologists have made a strong, empirically 
supported case that natural selection shaped our cognition to track truth. This negative project 
of rebutting the sceptic, however, should not be conflated with the positive project of 
justifying our beliefs in any given domain, notably our scientific beliefs. Failing to draw a 
sharp distinction between these two projects can lead to the problematic claim that 
evolutionary considerations warrant justification of complex scientific theories. This, we have 
argued, is false.  
Instead, we offer an alternative strategy available to the naturalist: Humean 
Bootstrapping. Rather than attempting to find foundations for our belief-forming 
mechanisms, wholesale, in their evolutionary origins, the naturalist should assess the 
reliability of these faculties empirically and in a piecemeal fashion. That is, per faculty and 
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per domain in which the faculty is employed. Drawing on recent work in the cognitive 
sciences, we have attempted to show how the cognitive ability to engage in such a 
justificatory process might be accounted for by the naturalist. We have argued that the ability 
to critically reflect on the output of our cognitive faculties is precisely what enables us to 
track truth in the enriched conceptual framework in which science operates, and that it is in 
this remarkable ability that we should anchor epistemic justification. 
We think that whether our cognitive faculties are reliable in any given domain, 
notably the domain of scientific inquiries, depends crucially on the empirical question of how 
they perform, and cannot be settled by “borrowing” warrant from the reliability of those same 
faculties in the domain of everyday, mundane beliefs. We hope that we have outlined a 
positive epistemological project to be pursued by the philosopher of science. This approach 
of tracking our track-records could also, we think, prove to be very relevant in the scientific 
realism debate. 
Finally, although our focus has been on the positive project, we hope also to have 
offered the naturalist a better defence against the sceptic and the traditional foundationalist, 
who often are very keen to point out the circularity of any naturalistic approach. 
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